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Power between Habitus and Reflexivity ± Introducing Margaret 
Archer to the Power Debate 
Abstract 
This article introduces 0DUJDUHW $UFKHU¶V research on reflexivity to the power 
debateDORQJVLGH3LHUUH%RXUGLHX¶VDOUHDG\LQIOXHQWLDOconcept of habitus. Both 
offer significant insights on social conditioning in late modernity. However, 
their tendency to the extreme of social determinism and voluntarism must be 
avoided. To do so, this article adopts +DXJDDUG¶Vfamily resemblance concept of 
power, describing habitus and reflexivity as an important new binary of power 
instead of a conceptual zero-sum game. This strengthens the explanatory role of 
agency, central to the three dimensions of power, without losing sight of 
constitutive, structural power. It also helps overcome the habitus-reflexivity 
dichotomy in social theory and provides a VWDUWLQJ SRLQW WR HYDOXDWH $UFKHU¶V
work from a power perspective. 
Keywords 
Family resemblance, habitus, reflexivity, Margaret Archer, Pierre Bourdieu, late 
modernity 
 
Introduction 
In the 20th century, the transformation of the scientific discussion on power followed 
wider changes in the social sciences. The debate originally profited from the emergence 
of modern political science and focused on state-centred forms of power (Berndtson 
2014). Today, it is constituted by numerous positions, accounting for more diffuse 
notions of power (Haugaard and Ryan 2012). This historical context becomes relevant 
ZKHQ FRQVLGHULQJ KRZ DQG ZK\ 0DUJDUHW $UFKHU¶V ZRUN VKRXOG EH LQWURGXFHG WR WKH
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power debate. 7KXV WKLV DUWLFOH DUJXHV WKDW$UFKHU¶VZRUNSURYLGHV DQ LPSRUWDQW DQG
necessary addition, while acknowledging WKH SRZHU OLWHUDWXUH¶V diverse range of 
normative, ontological, theoretical and empirical positions. In doing so, it focuses on 
her work on reflexivity, which can be introduced alongside its already established 
counterpart in social theory3LHUUH%RXUGLHX¶Vconcept of habitus. 
Archer developed her account as a response to critical realism lacking an 
explanation for how structures are mediated through agency. Furthermore, it is a 
response to conceptualisations of human beings as either autonomous beings of rational 
choice theory, or as social vessels lacking distinct agential properties. As part of the 
structure-agency debate, her work FDQDOVREHVHHQLQRSSRVLWLRQWR$QWKRQ\*LGGHQV¶
structuration theory and his work with Ulrich Beck and Scott Lash on reflexivity in late 
modernity ± for the relationship between Archer and Giddens, see Anthony King 
(Archer 2000, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2012; Beck et al. 1994; Giddens 1979; King 2010). 
Their differing positions, such as analytical dualism contra duality, and reflexive 
imperative against reflexive modernisation, have been well documented (Archer 2000, 
2003, 2007; Caetano 2015), and cannot be adequately discussed in this article.  
Instead, this article IRFXVHV RQ $UFKHU¶V UHVHDUFK RQ UHIOH[LYLW\ in relation to 
%RXUGLHX¶V KDELWXV Reflexivity for Archer describes the capacity of human beings to 
mediate our environment through internal conversation, prior to action. Habitus in 
contrast captures the social disposition, of which we are unconscious and which enables 
us to act in certain ways. Crucially, RQO\%RXUGLHX¶VKDELWXVKDVKDGa significant impact 
on the discussions of power ZKHUHDV $UFKHU¶V WKeories remain absent. However, 
Archer¶V UHFHQWZRUN provides a comprehensive alternative to the current adoption of 
%RXUGLHX¶VKDELWXV. Her humanist project of defending a stronger form of agency may 
WKXV KHOS RYHUFRPH %RXUGLHX¶V WHQGHQF\ WRZDUGV VRFLDO GHterminism. This, however, 
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first requires adopting a position that introduces her account of agency and reflexivity 
without its tendency towards voluntarism. The aim is not to reproduce the two sides of 
the habitus-reflexivity debate in social theory. 
The argument proceeds in three stages.  First, the four dimensional power debate 
is introduced, identifying both a move to internal and constitutive processes, and a lack 
RIHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$UFKHU¶VZRUN7KHQ this article discusses %RXUGLHX¶V concept of 
KDELWXVDQG$UFKHU¶VZRUNRQUHIOH[LYLW\, as part of the habitus-reflexivity debate and 
suggests potential criticisms. After establishing both accounts and their respective 
weaknesses, this article transcends their conflict by adopting Haugaard¶V IDPLO\
resemblance concept and the binary signature of power. This opens up the space to 
explore the link between Archer and the power literature, specifically in relation to the 
four dimensions of power, and to consider its implications for future research on power 
distribution in late modernity. 
 
The development of the four dimensions of power 
The debate on reflexivity aims to understand why people react differently to similar 
circumstances (Chalari 2009), a question reminiscent of Robert 'DKO¶V  202) 
example at the beginning of the contemporary power debate. He describes how some 
people are perceived to have the power to direct traffic while his attempt to do so would 
be perceived as mad. In other words, Dahl considers power by asking why similar 
actions in similar situations may have different effects. Put together, they exemplify the 
relatedness of the issues of social and political power with the causal powers and 
mediation processes of reflexivity. This suggests that to talk about reflexivity is to some 
extent to be concerned with power. 
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While Archer is aware of this connection in her work between reflexivity and 
social power, she and the commentators on her work do not extend that connection to 
the power debate. Archer offers numerous references to causal, personal, social, and 
other forms of power, but the existing engagement with works on power is limited and 
unsystematic (cf. Archer 2000: 265). The scientific debate on power similarly has not 
FRQVLGHUHGWKHYDOXHRI$UFKHU¶VZRUNIRU power analysis. First, therefore, this section 
explores the development of the debate on power, to understand how Archer can be 
introduced into this debate, and the benefits of bringing these together. 
The modern debate on power as we know it today started in early 20th century, 
with Berndtson (2014) providing rare insights on American discussions of power before 
the 1950s. However, Max Weber and Dahl are arguably the central figures of its 
beginning. Dahl, for example, famously defines power through its episodic exercise as 
µA has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
RWKHUZLVHGR¶ (Dahl 1957: 202-203). This is known as the first of three dimensions of 
power, with Philip Pettit (2008) and the recent special issue of the Journal of Political 
Power (Baldwin and Hauggard 2015) considering 'DKO¶VHQGXULQJLQIOXHQFH. 
Dahl (1957, 1958, 1961a, 1961b) separates power from resources to show how 
the US democratic process is pluralist and distinct from the unequal distribution of 
resources. In contrast, the second and third dimension can be seen as extensions, but 
also as LPSOLFLWFULWLTXHRI'DKO¶VQRUPDWLYHDLP+DXJDDUGE,QVWHDGRIWKH
pluralist emphasis, the second dimension of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) 
argues that power may act prior to the democratic process by means of exclusion of 
topics, intentionally and in favour of actor A against B. Steven Lukes (1974, 2005) 
challenges the static notioQRISUHIHUHQFHV VXJJHVWLQJ WKDWDFWRU$PD\ LQIOXHQFH%¶V
interests so that B acts against his/her real interests, leading to latent conflict (Lukes 
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1974: 28). This dimension offers an important move away from the rational choice 
model of agency, which Archer similarly rejects. However, the move towards extensive 
considerations of internal processes, e.g. reflexivity, remains underdeveloped and raised 
concerns about its elitist connotations. As Lukes discusses with Clarissa Hayward 
(2008), this position overemphasises responsibility and blame for so-called ³powerful 
people´. It also causes difficulties for the empirical focus of the previous dimensions, 
with John Gaventa (1980) offering a rare empirical study using all three faces of power. 
More recently, the ³SRZHUcube´ may prove a successful adoption of Lukes and Gaventa 
for an actor-centred approach to empirical power analysis (Hathaway 2015). 
Peter Digeser added a fourth dimension in The Fourth Face of Power (1992), 
GHVSLWH/XNHV¶ claim that his position and the Foucauldian understanding of power are 
LQFRPSDWLEOH +DXJDDUG E  7KH IRXUWK GLPHQVLRQ RU ³IDFH´ RI SRZHU
describes the subjectification of human beings into social beings as part of the system. It 
became popular in IR scholarship following Michael Barnett¶V DQG5D\PRQG'XYDOO¶V
Power in International Politics (2005). In their article, the four dimensions are termed 
as i) compulsory power, ii) institutional power, iii) structural power, and iv) productive 
power (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 42). Together with further insights from various 
debates throughout the social sciences, e.g. feminism, these four dimensions encompass 
a wide range of claims and developments central to understanding power. Furthermore, 
as Haugaard together with Kevin Ryan (2012) suggests, the power debate can also be 
distinguished in the three meta-language games of power: consensual, conflictual, and 
constitutive. They formulate problems inherent to each of them, albeit that Amy Allen 
(2014) suggests they are sympathetic to the constitutive. 
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Situating reflexivity in the context of the four dimensions of power 
This short overview of the power literature enables two initial comments central to the 
argument developed in this article. The first comment concerns the increasing relevance 
and comprehensive nature of constitutive formulations of power. This move started with 
/XNHV¶ consideration of real interests, and was extended through the addition of the 
fourth dimension, central to continental European thought on power. The potential 
issues with such a move are exemplified below using %RXUGLHX¶V LQIOXHQWLDO
conceptualisation of habitus. Despite his insistence on its creative nature, critics have 
suggested a tendency towards social determinism. Archer also adds the critique of social 
imperialism, i.e. attempts to reduce all human activities to the social sphere. 
Building on this, the second comment concerns the introduction of Archer. As 
the overview shows, the power debate provides a sophisticated, comprehensive account 
of the phenomenon of power. This is not to ignore the continued contested nature of 
these four dimensions. It raises the question, why this connection tR$UFKHU¶VZRUN LV 
underdeveloped. While Lukes insists on keeping the focus on forms of domination 
(Hayward and Lukes 2008), Haugaard, in his article on the topic (2012a), suggests a re-
interpretation. Power theorists often separate power to and power with, as empowering 
and intrinsically positive, from power over, as negative opposite domination. Haugaard 
wishes to transcend such attempts, instead putting forward a more positive, Arendtian 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI SRZHU DV DFWLQJ LQ FRQFHUW WDNLQJ WKH PHWDSKRU ³FRQFHUW´ OLWHUDOO\
(Haugaard 2012a: 34). In this account, the same empirical process potentially leads to 
normatively desirable and objectionable forms of power. For example, exclusion can 
both result in justice or domination (Haugaard 2012a: 51). Thus, Haugaard together 
with Allen and Rainer Forst (2014) argues for seeing power as normatively Janus faced, 
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DUJXDEO\EHVWVXLWHGWR$UFKHU¶VZRUNDOWKRXJKVKHGRHVQRWSURYLGHDQ\MXGgement of 
this kind. At best she does not seem to favour any of these, emphasising personal, 
social, and cultural forms of power equally. As discussed below, reflexivity also seems 
a neutral capacity concerning its use for power. Combining the two comments, this 
DUWLFOH H[SORUHV $UFKHU¶V SRWHQWLDO FRQWULEXWLRQV WR WKH IRXU GLPHQVLRQV RI SRZHU DQG
discussion on power more broadly. 7KLV ILUVW UHTXLUHV LQWURGXFLQJ $UFKHU¶V DQG
%RXUGLHX¶VFRQFHSWVUHIOH[LYLW\DQGKDELWXVLQWKHLUFXUUHQWIRUPDVSDUWRIWKHKDEitus-
reflexivity dichotomy. 
 
Power and habitus: emphasising the social 
Habitus has been discussed in different ways in much of classic sociology, e.g. by Emile 
Durkheim, Max Weber, or Georg Simmel. Today, it is particularly associated with and 
popularized by Bourdieu (Archer 2010; Haugaard 2008a). Increasingly, his concept of 
habitus has been widely used in power literature and analysis, and Bourdieu has become 
a significant representative of a more constitutive notion of power (Haugaard 2008a; 
Luckes 2005). For Bourdieu habitus ± intentionally distinguished from the term habits ± 
is the µdurably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations¶ (Bourdieu 
,QRWKHUZRUGVLWFRQVWLWXWHVµsystems of durable, transposable dispositions¶ 
(Bourdieu 1977: 72). Thus, habitus is, at the same time, embodied, individualised, and 
inherently reflects shared cultural context. &UXFLDOO\ IRU %RXUGLHX¶V DFFRXQW LWs 
principles are placed outside the grasp of consciousness (Adams 2006: 514). In more 
general terms, it refers to our way of being in the world, our µpredisposed ways of 
thinking, acting and moving in and through the social environment¶ (Sweetman 2003: 
532). Giddens (1984) similarly describes practical consciousness as knowledge that 
allows peoplH WR ³JR RQ´ E\ UHSURGXFLQJ WKH URXWLQH HOHPHQWV of social life. Another 
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LPSRUWDQW FRQFHSW LV %RXUGLHX¶V QRWLRQ RI ILHOG It refers to µthe always existing, 
REOLJDWRU\ERXQGDULHVRIH[SHULHQWLDO FRQWH[W >«@ WKH ILHOG LQVWDQWLDWHVXVDV VXEMHFWV
and reproduces social distinctions via the enactment of habitus¶ (Adams 2006: 514). 
Bourdieu attempts to transcend the traditional structure-agency dichotomy and 
therefore conceptualises habitus not simply as operating in a rule-like fashion. Instead, 
he emphasises the creative, active, and inventive capacity that only µin the relation to 
FHUWDLQVWUXFWXUHV>«@SURGXFHVJLYHQGLVFRXUVHVRUSUDFWLFHV¶ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 135). For Bourdieu habitus as embodied social structures allows for constant 
improvisation without requiring consciousness of it. Using the analogy of a game, the 
good player has a habitus that allows him/her to always react the right way simply 
through the feel for the game. 
 
Potential criticisms 
Commentators remain nonetheless concerned with the emphasis on the unconscious and 
its implications for the explanatory power of habitus. Dave Elder-Vass for example, 
argues that Bourdieu µneglects the role of conscious thought in both the development 
and the operation RI WKH KDELWXV¶ (Elder-Vass 2007: 327). However, to be dismissive 
about the active, conscious elements of decision making is to make them seem 
unimportant. This then reduces reflexivity to times of crisis, where habitus and 
objective environment are at odds ± blips, where action has undesired effects. This 
includes, for example, being made redundant, moving out of the family home, or the 
extreme case of war, which may require the modification of habitus itself (Elder-Vass 
2007: 329). Unfortunately, how this narrow form of reflexivity is possible and what its 
QDWXUHLVUHPDLQXQFOHDULQ%RXUGLHX¶VZRUN&URVVOH\ 2001: 117). Thus, he seems for 
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some critics, despite his insistence otherwise, unable to resist affirming determinism 
(Alexander 1995: 140). 
The implications of this underdeveloped role of consciousness has been 
especially well documented for the practice of playing tennis (Noble and Watkins 2003; 
Strandbu and Steen-Johnsen 2014). Tennis seems a particularly tempting case of human 
action as Bourdieu was an avid tennis player. Greg Noble and Megan Watkins therefore 
argue that without a more reflexive acquisition of skills than Bourdieu allows for in his 
concept of habitus, playing at such a level would be impossible. They also identify a 
failure of Bourdieu to account for habituation as distinct from the absence of 
consciousness. 
This tendency to downplay the role of conscious, reflective human processes 
and action was the starting point for Archer to seek an alternative account of agency. 
+RZHYHU%RXUGLHX¶VZRUNLVDOVRFHQWUDOWR this article because his concept of habitus 
offers an important, successful attempt to transcend the traditional structure-agency 
dichotomy in social sciences. By accounting for the feel for the game, i.e. the 
unconscious embodiment of social and cultural structures, Bourdieu opens the space to 
consider the mediation between structural and cultural power, and the individual. It is, 
therefore, LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI %RXUGLHX¶V ZRUN GHVSLWH WKHVH FRQWLQXLQJ FULWLcisms, that 
$UFKHU¶VUHFHQWZRUNGHYHORSVLWVIXOOSRWHQWLDOIRUWKHSRZHUGHEDWH 
 
Habitus in the power debate 
Exemplary for the introduction of habitus to the power debate is Haugaard, who has 
used the concept in numerous publications with one article (2008a) specifically focusing 
on the relationship between power and habitus. Haugaard also refers to reflexivity in 
relation to Anthony Giddens (cf. Haugaard 2002: 216). In his article on habitus, he 
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states that µthe capacity to put our habitus into discursiYH UXOHV >«@ LV WKH VRXUFH RI
human reflexivity. Actors can distance themselves from their habitus by making it 
discursive. In this process, they become ³strangers´ to themselves¶ (2008a: 193). He 
continues by seeing in reflexivity the possibility of a capacity of humanist agency ± the 
result of turning habitus discursively to become stranger to oneself. While being a step 
towards Archer¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIUHIOH[LYLW\, the notion of turning into a stranger, or 
turning habitus discursive, remains distinct to $UFKHU¶V (2010) critical, limiting stance 
towards habitus as the unconscious embodiment of social structures. More importantly, 
Archer provides a more extensive account of the nature of reflexivity. Building on this 
example of a power theorist deploying the concept habitus (and reflexivity), a similar 
analysis of other adoptions of Bourdieu and habitus could be expected. For example, the 
Journal of Political Power has produced a significant number of articles that, with 
varying degree, rely on Bourdieu. The analysis of their content would presumably 
reproduce the impression developed so far ± ERWKRI WKHYDOXHRI %RXUGLHX¶V DFFRXQW
and the problem of consciousness. Such criticisms are also not new and therefore not 
WKH PDLQ IRFXV RI WKLV DUWLFOH %RXUGLHX¶V account has important insights and major 
SUREOHPV 7KH TXHVWLRQ LV WKHUHIRUH WR ZKDW H[WHQW $UFKHU¶V FRQceptualisation of 
reflexivity as counterargument fares better. 
 
Archer ± Reflexivity through Internal Conversation 
For a long time, reflexivity remained under conceptualised and researched. As Archer 
(2007: 62) put it, reflexivity is like the dead soldier with unknown identity, which 
despite much admiration, no one attempts to identify. More recently, it has become 
increasingly popular as term for an external phenomenon, in the form UHIOH[LYH [« 
(Archer 2008: 2). Similarly, an extended reflexivity thesis in late modernity has become 
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commonplace with social theorists as the belief that there is increasing reflexivity in 
society (Adams 2006: 512). As discussed in the Journal of Political Power, the 
influential social theorists Zygmunt Bauman, Giddens, and Beck all share this claim of 
extended reflexivity in late modernity (Dawson 2010). However, the reasons for this 
transformation are as contested as the notion of reflexivity itself. Giddens and Beck for 
example, LGHQWLI\WKHODFNRIVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHDVEDVLFIHDWXUHRIODWHPRGHUQLW\¶VVRFLDO
structure, leading to heightened reflexivity (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Giddens 
1991). Archer, in contrast, rejects this portrayal of the relationship between 
traditionalism and reflexivity as zero-sum (Archer 2012: 3; Akram 2012: 48). Instead, 
she turns to the internal processes of agency to find her alternative account of the 
mediation between structure and agency with clear implications for late modernity. 
Archer developed her account of reflexivity in a trilogy of books (2003, 2007, 
2012), building on two series of qualitative, explorative interviews. Their aim was to 
identify patterns of reflexivity and their transformation in late modernity, with one 
focusing on the students in her department at the University of Warwick, and the other 
on residents of the city of Coventry. She conceives reflexivity as a mediation process 
between the internal and external world, defining it as µthe regular exercise of the 
mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their 
(social) contexts and vice versa¶ (Archer 2007: 4). Internal conversation thus becomes 
µUHIOH[LYLW\¶V PRGDOLW\¶ (Chalari 2009: 5) and the talk µall normal people have with 
themselves, within their own heads, usually silently and usually from an early age¶ 
(Archer 2007: 2). Furthermore, as Archer (2008: 2) emphasises, reflexive deliberation 
diverges extensively and significantly between people, unlike common assumption. 
This becomes clear as she describes different modes of reflexivity. 
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Dominant modes of reflexivity 
Archer concludes from her explorative interviews the existence of four exhaustive 
modes of reflexivity: communicative, autonomous, meta-, and fractured. All 
participants not only exhibited all of these modes of reflexivity ± in varying degrees ± 
but also possessed one distinctive dominant mode of reflexivity with a small number 
having two dominant modes (Archer 2007: 94).  
Communicative reflexives externalize elements of their internal conversation, 
choosing a more intra-personal ³WKRXJKWDQGWDON´ process, as they mistrust their private 
deliberation (Archer 2003: 167). They are surrounded by numerous reciprocal relations 
with social institutions, e.g. family, church, school/university, partners, and friends 
(Archer 2012: 135). They aim for FRQWH[WXDOFRQWLQXLW\DQGVKRZµsmooth dovetailing 
of concerns¶ (Archer 2003: 169) by prioritising family and friends over other concerns 
or contentment. Thus, only circumstantial, but not personal, changes are considered and 
the identified social horizon is maintained. Communicative reflexives identify with their 
natal context from which they gained high relational goods and, as they value these 
highly, they wish to reproduce these in their own family (Archer 2012: 164). They tend 
to be apolitical as they believe they have already established their desired micro-cosmos 
(Archer 2003: 184). 
In contrast, autonomous reflexives are decisive, self-assured, and see their 
deliberative process as self-sufficient, not out of arrogance but rather, suspicion, as they 
DUHZLOOLQJWR LQFOXGHRWKHU¶VH[SHUWLVH in their own consideration (Archer 2003: 210). 
Their reflexive process is task-oriented. They are also good at dove-tailing their 
concerns (Archer 2003: 213), but are individualist and search for contextual 
GLVFRQWLQXLW\ DQG µsupra-contextual knowledge¶ (Archer 2003: 251). The autonomous 
reflexive was shown to have articulate social concerns and lack relational goods ± they 
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were µparented by two individuals rather than by a couple¶ (Archer 2012: 168). They 
attach less value to social order, instead investing heavily in the practical order, for 
example, by learning instruments, sports, or languages (Archer 2012: 169). As a result, 
making friends is not a high priority, is of low interpersonal intensity, and expression of 
their practical interests (Archer 2012: 179). This utility-friendship seems therefore to be 
a partnership rather than a friendship (van Hoef 2014: 69). In contrast to the other 
groups, autonomous reflexives are uncritical of employment in corporate enterprise or 
governmental bureaucracy, but see the employment as a means to an end, as ethical 
concerns are incorporated in personal agendas (Archer 2012: 188). 
Finally, meta-reflexives use their reflexive deliberation to question not only 
propositions but also themselves (Archer 2003: 255). The meta-reflexives problematise 
the social order instead of normalizing or internalizing it (Archer 2012: 207). Their 
reflexive process is value-oriented, neither replicating their natal background nor 
accepting normative conventionalism (Archer 2012: 208). They receive relational goods 
(Archer 2012: 245), but also mixed messages concerning normative claims about the 
social order, leaving them to find their own position from a young age (Archer 2012: 
246). Their actions are characterized by volatility, both recurrent contextual incongruity 
and tendency to frequently re-qualify, leading to a voluntarily chosen sideways mobility 
and gravitating towards work in the third sector (Archer 2007: 252). 
 
Potential Criticisms 
$UFKHU¶VKXPDQLVW DLP LV to strengthen the role of agency by describing more clearly 
what this agency and its powers actually entails ± as opposed to, for example, the 
rational choice model of agency ± and comes with costs. Where Bourdieu has been 
shown to tend towards social determinism, Archer in turn has been criticised for 
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overemphasising the reflexive, intentional aspects of social conditioning. It may seem 
WKHUHIRUH µthat Archer enthrones reflexivity while Bourdieu condemns it to servility¶
(Elder-Vass 2007: 325). Thus, while the account of both sides put forward does 
undeniably favour Archer in her rejection for example RI%RXUGLHX¶VVRFLDOLPSHULDOLVP
(Archer 2000; 2010: 292), scholars of power should be aware of some of the recent 
criticisms. 
As the only empirically founded sociological approach on reflexivity through 
internal conversation, LW KDV EHFRPH µparadigmatic in the sociological field¶ (Caetano 
2015: 2). Criticisms, therefore, are often of a more theoretical nature, as in the 
structuration-realist debate that preceded AUFKHU¶V UHVHDUFK RQ UHIOH[LYLW\. Where 
commentators once questioned her understanding of structuration theory (King 2010; 
Piiroinen 2014; Stones 2001), criticV QRZ IRFXV RQ KHU GHVFULSWLRQ RI %RXUGLHX¶V
habitus. However, the critique also focuses on the reduced role of the causal power of 
structures and their temporal pre-existence to action, particularly in ArFKHU¶VHPSLULFDO
research (Caetano 2015: 4). Ian Burkitt (2012: 464) furthermore rejects $UFKHU¶V
positioning of reflexivity in the private sphere and sees her statement of reflexivity as 
relatively autonomous property of agency as a big step down from the original realist 
position, where structures and agency are seen as analytically distinctive. Thus, doubts 
remain to what extent Archer was able to sufficiently characterise the interplay between 
structure and agency at reflexivity level. Ana Caetano (2015: 5) also doubts that the 
empirical evidence sufficiently VXSSRUWV $UFKHU¶V WKHRUHWLFDO FODLPV, particularly 
concerning the reflexive imperative through contextual incongruity, which will be 
discussed below. Other critiques have suggested that $UFKHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIHPRWLRQLV
too limited, with Archer missing the role of relational emotions, i.e. the way humans 
emotionally identify with others and how this affects their internal conversation (Burkitt 
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2012: 463). Emotions and feeling are not simply µattendants to reflexivity, they are the 
basis and motive RIUHIOH[LYHWKRXJKW>«@RXUWKRXJKWVDUHDOways coloured by emotion 
so that we never see the world in a neutral way¶ (Burkitt 2012: 469). Indeed, the 
relational dimension seems extensively lacking. King therefore pushes British 
sociologists to look sideways against the vertical dualism of structure and agency, and 
towards collective action. He describes a potential new book title for Archer as µBeing 
Social: Collective Action and the Public Conversation¶ (2010: 259), in reference to her 
book Being Human: The Problem of Agency (Archer 2000). Archer, together with 
Pierpaolo Donati, seems to have followed this train of thought, as visible in her new 
publication The Relational Subject (2015). Lastly, Philip Walsh (2015: 73) identifies a 
difficulty for Archer, when developing a more extensive historical account. He also 
DGRSWV $UHQGW WR LGHQWLI\ LQ $UFKHU¶V ZRUN a biased connection of reflexivity with 
action which cannot sufficiently account for the non-active features of reflexivity. 
While all these points provide useful starting points for extending or amending 
her concepts and insights, they do not take away the groundbreaking nature of her 
research on reflexivity through internal conversation. What we are left with is two 
%RXUGLHX¶V DQG $UFKHU¶V KLJKO\ LQIOXHQWLDO DQG FRPSUHKHQVLYH DFFRXQWV RI VRFLDO
conditioning, each providing a significant step forward from the traditional structure-
agency problem, and each struggling to describe consciousness appropriately. As one 
tends towards social determinism and imperialism, and is unable to describe the role of 
consciousness sufficiently, the other moves towards a voluntarist, acting individual 
without drawing on the rich insights of the power debate. This raises the following 
crucial questions for this article: how can both frameworks be implemented as part of 
the power literature, without simply replacing the structure-agency dichotomy with a 
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reflexivity-KDELWXV GLFKRWRP\" :KDW WKHQ DUH WKH LQVLJKWV RQ SRZHU WKDW $UFKHU¶V
account can provide in this new approach to mediation between structure and agency? 
 
Hybridisation ± a way forward? 
Several social theorists have tried an alternative approach to habitus and reflexivity: 
hybridization (Adams 2006; Elder-Vass 2007; Mouzelis 2007; Sweetman 2003). 
Unfortunately, their sophisticated attempts cannot be adequately described or rejected 
here but deserve a brief consideration. A short discussion must suffice prior to offering 
another, potentially better solution. Archer also DFNQRZOHGJHV WKHLU DFFRXQWV¶
VRSKLVWLFDWHG QDWXUH DQG DLP WR JR IXUWKHU WKDQ VWDWHPHQWV RI ³VRPHWLPHV WKH RQH
VRPHWLPHV WKH RWKHU´ E\ DWWHPSWLQJ WR VSHFLI\ WKH ZKHUH ZKHQ DQG XQGHU ZKDW
conditions. Nonetheless, she rejects any such attempt, stating that aiming µto short 
circuit this specification  by performing a shotgun wedding between habit and 
reflexivity and calling its offspring ³hybridization´ achieves nothing of theoretical 
utility¶ (2010: 277). In hybridization, she identifies an attempt µto put a label on this 
complexity [of historical transformations] rather than to understand and explain what is 
going on¶ (2010: 278). 
The hybrid accounts diverge according to the extent to which theoretical 
concessions are made, leading to an empirical combination, the concept of reflexive 
habitus, or even an ontological and theoretical reconciliation through emergent social 
theory of action (Caetano 2015: 4 fn5). For example, Fleetwood and Sayer do so at an 
empirical level, asking Archer to be more generous towards continuous socialization 
without expecting major theoretical changes (Archer 2010: 287, Fleetwood 2008; Sayer 
2009). Archer challenges this empirical hybridization by identifying the importance of 
habitus and reflexivity as distinguishable at a historical level ± as discussed in relation 
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to late modernity.  Similarly, it is doubtful that Bourdieu would have accepted such an 
approach, even though it would protect him from the claims of determinism. More 
importantly, there may be disagreement between Archer, Sayer, and Fleetwood on the 
extent to which modern transformations leave room for habitus and how this is 
expressed. The bigger issue is hybridization at a theoretical level, which constitutes 
concept stretching (Archer 2  $Q\ VXFK DWWHPSW KDV WR LQFRUSRUDWH $UFKHU¶V
SRVLWLRQDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVLQWR%RXUGLHX¶VGLVSRVLWLRQDODQDO\VLVZLWKRXWIDYRXULQJRQH
RYHU WKH RWKHU 3DXO 6ZHHWPDQ¶V (2003) hybrid argues for a continuous disjunction 
between habitus and field which allows for reflexivity as reflexive habitus. Archer 
(2010: 288) questions if this constant expectation of change, the awareness of having to 
think, can still be grasped by a notion of habitus and if reflexive habitus explains 
DQ\WKLQJDERXWSHRSOH¶VGHOLberation and what they do. Similarly, 0RX]HOLV¶VROXWLRQRI
reflexivity as a result of socialisation and not crisis, that can be especially experienced 
in religious communities emphasising the inner life, cannot explain widespread 
transformation of reflexivity and habitus in late modernity, particularly in the context of 
contemporary secular socialization (Archer 2010: 289). 
Finally, Elder-Vass¶ hybrid aims for a combination through an emergentist 
WKHRU\RIDFWLRQ+RZHYHU$UFKHUREMHFWVWR%RXUGLHX¶VFRQIlation of action and social 
action, his failure to identify different orders of reality, and his rejection of the dualism 
between objectivity and subjectivity (Archer 2$JDLQVW WKH µepistemological 
hegemony in every order of reality¶ (Archer 2010: 290) of habitus, Archer emphasizes 
that the co-determination varies extensively between orders, with the social order 
particularly being the most reflexive and least habitual (Archer 2010: 293). This, among 
other criticisms of Elder-9DVV¶DFFRXQW, shows the complexity and difficulty facing such 
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attempts DQG $UFKHU¶V FHQWUDO REMHFWLRQ that co-determination does not equate to 
approximate equal determination by habitus and reflexivity. 
 
Habitus, reflexivity, and the family resemblance concept of power 
The American three-dimensions-of-SRZHU GHEDWH FRQFOXGHG ZLWK /XNHV¶  VKRUW
but influential book Power: A Radical View, and the declaration that the 
conceptualisation of power was essentially contested (Connolly 1983, Lukes 1974 
2005). However, Haugaard (2010) reframed the power debate as describing a family 
resemblance concept. He questioned the interests behind declaring power as essentially 
contested, especially as Lukes nonetheless maintained the superiority of his own 
definition (Haugaard 2010: 420). Instead, Haugaard proposed the adoption of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein to define power as constituting a family resemblance concept of which the 
constitutive concepts are in turn changing, depending on the adopted language game. 
This shift is of particular relevance for the introduction of the habitus-reflexivity debate 
± as put forward in this article ± as a complex contextual relation rather than a clear 
dichotomy favouring one over the other. 
The family resemblance concept approach sees power as a positive-sum game 
where concepts complement each other instead of a quest for one exhaustive definition 
of power (Haugaard 2010: 420). This approach allows for significant differences in 
underlying general commitments ± in the case of Archer, a commitment to critical 
realism ± as each position is seen to potentially provide significant observations about 
the complex phenomenon of power. As a consequence, essential contestedness is 
limited to the normative dimension of power (Haugaard 2010: 422). Keith Dowding 
(2012: 121) even proposes having as few normative assumptions as possible in key 
definitions. 
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Instead of essential contestedness, confusion and conflict now arise from 
moving between language games (Haugaard 2010: 427). This is visible in the works of 
Lukes and Foucault, and exemplified in the exchange between Pamela Pansardi and 
Peter Morriss (Morriss 2012; Pansardi 2012a 2012b). For Morriss (2012: 91), 
conceptual analysis provides clarification of terminology rather than more substantive 
claims. However, KH   LGHQWLILHV 3DQVDUGL¶V D FODLP DERXW WKH
distinction between power to and power over as falling into the latter category. Pansardi 
(2012b: 495) in turn suggests that her aim was to leave the language game of power to 
and power over behind altogether, for the less qualified notion of social power. Such 
discussions at different conceptual levels are particularly visible in relation to the just 
discussed attempts of hybridisation. 
All the different expressions of power matter, and although they are not rivals, 
they can be seen as better fit for a specific case or analysis, or for theoretical and 
normative reasons. Thus, to adopt a family resemblance notion of power is not to 
succumb to relativism. Instead, Haugaard (2010: 426) emphasises as criteria, the 
principles of best fit for theory, the dependence on the phenomena to be discussed, and 
the necessity as conceptual tool to relate to common use allowing the reader to follow 
the argument. This is similarly valid for adopting Archer alongside Bourdieu, as the 
IROORZLQJ H[DPSOH PDNHV FOHDU &ROHWWH +DUULV¶  SRVW-conflict case study of 
gender-age relations in northern Uganda uses Bourdieu to identify the local habitus. 
This, according to Harris, DOORZVDGGUHVVLQJJHQGHUIURPWKHORFDOKDELWXV¶SHUVSHFWLYH
and is essential to this article¶VDLPWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHSUHYDLOLQJSRZHUUHODWLRQVDQGWR
suggest positive change (Harris 2012: 476). In response, it might be claimed that by 
introducing the concept of reflexivity as a more fluid, intentional account of agency, one 
may be better adapt at grasping the intentional way in which the current power relations 
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are maintained, including the vested interests of each position. Similarly, a focus on 
fractured reflexivity may enhance the description of how the social transformation left 
some people inactive and thus powerless. At the same time, habitus is arguably a better 
fit with WKLVVSHFLILFSKHQRPHQRQDV$UFKHU¶VDFFRXQWIRFXVHVRQPRGHVRIUHIOH[LYLty 
LQ ODWHPRGHUQLW\RI FDSLWDOLVW VRFLHWLHV6KHHYHQHPSKDVLVHV WKDW%RXUGLHX¶VDFFRXQW
may be more relevant for other periods of time. The adoption of habitus and reflexivity 
as conceptualised by Archer and Bourdieu is therefore, case sensitive. This 
interpretation seems to fit better with ArchHU¶VDLPVWKDQK\EULGLVDWLRQRU an essentially 
contested dichotomy. The insight from the power debate for this relationship can 
however be extended even further. 
 
The binary signature of power 
Traditionally, the power debate has developed in binary, most notably as power to and 
power over (Dean 2012: 106). Furthermore, these binaries have conventionally been 
LQWHUSUHWHGDVGLFKRWRPLHV7KHFODVVLFH[DPSOHIRUDGLFKRWRP\LV$UHQGW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQ
between violence and power as mutually exclusive (Arendt 1970; Walsh 2015: 86), 
although Haugaard (2012a: 35) offers a more nuanced interpretation. Power as a binary 
concept can be attributed to structures/systems and agency. It can be dispositional, 
relational and exercised, ubiquitous, obscure and immeasurable, measurable and visible, 
consensual and conflictual, zero- and positive-sum, power to, power with, and power 
over, and empowering and dominating (Dowding 2012: 119). 
A particularly useful reinterpretation of the binary signature of power describes 
power as a force field where these two parts of a binary, as polarities, attract and repel 
each other and where the power theorist has to account for both (Dean 2012: 108). This 
interpretation, therefore, rejects the conceptualisation as dichotomies. It also supports 
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reading habitus and reflexivity if introduced as such a binary of power, as polarities, 
rather than the common interpretation as somewhat mutually exclusive. Archer (2010) 
seems open for such an interpretation, maintaining that particularly in the social sphere 
of human affairs, reflexivity is more present whereas in others habitus plays a more 
decisive role. With a suitable approach found to accommodate for Archer alongside 
Bourdieu, the final question remains whDW$UFKHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQWKH
four dimensions of power could be. 
 
Power and reflexivity: considering active agency in late modernity 
The overview on the four dimensions of power suggested a close relationship between 
reflexivity and power, by connecting 'DKO¶V WUDIILF H[DPSOH with the central question 
for research on reflexivity, why people react differently in similar situations. This 
connection may seem obvious, and yet striking if put in a more radical form: to 
conceptualise reflexivity is to consider power. This is striking, especially, as a reading 
of the Journal of Political Power suggests that reflexivity is seldom mentioned 
extensively, and often in relation to the thought of Foucault, Bourdieu, but also Anthony 
Giddens. However, it is LQ $UFKHU¶V ZRUN that reflexivity becomes central to agential 
capabilities and the crucial link between structure and agency, that is inherently 
subjective but nonetheless sufficiently patterned, and which significantly constraints 
and enables how human beings access power in society. Her conceptualisation of 
reflexivity is about power, and adds a different dimension to accounts of agential power. 
Exemplary, 6WHYHQ/XNHV¶FOHDUO\IDYRXUVDJHQWLDOSRZHULQERWKHGLWLRQVRIPower: A 
Radical View (Lukes 1974, 2005). The second edition also offers an extensive analysis 
DQGFULWLTXHRI%RXUGLHX¶VDFFount of habitus (2005: 139-144), while his own preferred 
alternative remains elusive. In what follows, this article therefore offers a consideration 
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of the link between power and Archer, focusing on three key areas: active agency, 
reflexivity as four-dimensional power, and transformations of reflexivity in late 
modernity. 
 
Reflexivity as active agency and its effects on social mobility 
Archer describes a society of active agents who act and thus shape their environment 
based on their patterned reflexive responses to the socio-cultural context. She 
consequently UHSODFHV %RXUGLHX¶V GLVSRVLWLRQDO FRQFHSW KDELWXV ZLWK D more dynamic 
positional and above all conscious account of social mediation. The dominant modes of 
reflexivity identified in her studies are shown to access power and resources in society 
differently as they seek or choose not to seek opportunities of social mobility. Dominant 
communicative reflexives are shown to adopt an evasive, self-sacrificial social stance, 
autonomous a strategic, self-disciplinary, and meta-reflexives a subversive, self-
transcendent social stance (Archer 2003: 316, 342). Stances LQ $UFKHU¶V DFFRXQW 
µconstitute the macro-micro link¶ (Archer 2003: 343) DVKXPDQEHLQJV¶ basic means of 
orientation towards society. 
$UFKHU¶VZRUNGRHVOLPLWUHIOH[LYLW\LQWKDWit is not to be conflated with personal 
identity, and can only show tendencies of social behaviour (Archer 2007: 133). Humans 
have a combination of modes of reflexivity, albeit that the dominant mode is crucial to 
KRZ ZH UHDFW WR VLWXDWLRQV 7KLV OLPLWDWLRQ FRUUHVSRQGV WR $UFKHU¶V FULWLFDO UHDlist 
commitments, which assume an open society with continuously emerging properties 
and complex, intransitive causal mechanisms. Modes of reflexivity are thus not 
statically linked to socio-occupational backgrounds as a continuous thread from birth 
onwards. Instead, Archer identifies a link as tendency to the current socio-economic 
position (Archer 2007: 146). She proposes a dialectical connection between concerns 
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and context as acceptance (or rejection) of dialogical partners from natal contexts, 
which becomes refined and reinforced until a particular modus vivendi is established. In 
the case of the communicative reflexive, this modus vivendi is continuous with the 
VXEMHFW¶V RULJLQDO FRQWH[WV DQG OHDGV WR VRFLDO LPPRELOLW\ +XPDQ EHLQJV¶ UHIOH[LYLW\
develops over time into stable modus vivendi which allows them to become active 
agents, constantly mediating the external and internal world and responding to it 
accordingly. Reflexivity as modus vivendi thus becomes a crucial, emergent personal 
property. For Archer it has genuine interiority, ontological subjectivity, and causal 
efficacy, which secure LWV UROH DV FHQWUDO WR DQ\ µDGHTXDWH FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI Vocial 
FRQGLWLRQLQJ¶$UFKHU 
Reflexivity patterns how power resources are exploited, in addition to, how, as a 
result, power may be unevenly distributed in society. Archer claims that reflexivity 
develops into modus vivendi that are linked to specific social stances which offer an 
µoverall pattern of response to the totality of structural powers¶ (2003: 343). Combined 
ZLWKKHUSDVWZRUNRQVWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\$UFKHU¶Vconceptualisation of active agency 
through reflexivity provides a full account of the interrelation between all forms of 
power, i.e. structural, cultural and personal powers, as one of the most comprehensive 
accounts of power. 
 
Reflexivity as four dimensional power 
This article KDVWKXVIDUEULGJHGWKHJDSEHWZHHQ$UFKHU¶VZRUNRQUHIOH[LYLW\DQGWKH
power literature by emphasising that dominant modes of reflexivity shape how someone 
can access socio-economic and cultural resources. This insight can be extended by 
considering how reflexivity fits into the schemata of the four dimensions of power. 
Archer is a critical realist and therefore her work can be seen in line with previous work 
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on critical realism and the four dimensions of power (Bates 2010; Isaac 1987). 
However, the insights on reflexivity as crucial agential capacity to mediate and shape 
our external world go beyond a specific philosophy of social science, as visible in 
relation to each dimension of power. 
The first dimension of power considers how actor %¶V DFWLRQV DUH FKDQJHG
through coercion to suit the needs of actor A. Modus vivendi can be the source and 
means of coercion, and provide the potential for overcoming or resisting coercion 
through active agency. It can be a tool for coercion as, for example, in a society of 
predominantly communicative reflexives someone can easily make an autonomous 
reflexive assimilate their behaviour and thought. Otherwise, the diverging concerns and 
thirst for social mobility will lead to conflict and repercussions. Similarly, for 
communicative reflexives, family and friends cDQXVHWKHUHIOH[LYHVQHHGIRU³thought 
DQGWDON´WRconvince them to act in different ways. Archer thus offers us an account of 
reflexivity where differences in and characteristics of modes of reflexivity can become a 
form of power at an individual, micro, or macro-level, and dependent on the context. 
The second dimension considers the use of social and political values and 
institutional practices to limit the issues considered in the public sphere. The example 
above applies here, too: A specific dominant or ruling mode of reflexivity may be 
implemented to the disadvantage of other forms of dominant modes of reflexivity. In 
more concrete terms, a government that portrays or supports the stereotype of the 
hardworking citizen, with specific education and concerns, may thus favour 
autonomous reflexives over communicative or meta-reflexives. This then leads to a 
society where sacrificing social mobility for the sake of the family, or continuous 
requalification in line with other social concerns is made increasingly difficult and 
costly.   
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The third and fourth dimensions of power, concerned with cognitive and 
RQWRORJLFDO SURFHVVHV LQ VRFLHW\ VHHP WKH PRVW REYLRXV IRU LQWURGXFLQJ $UFKHU¶V
account ± although, as so far suggested, each dimension can be extended by considering 
reflexivity as separate agential capacity. The third dimension remains problematic 
because it accounts for the change of internal processes by others without a sufficient 
account of their nature. Instead, /XNHV¶ claim to false consciousness presupposed true 
consciousness (Haugaard 2012a: 46). Archer provides a comprehensive account of 
consciousness and thiVRSHQVWKHSRVVLELOLW\WRDVVHUWWKDWVRPHRQH¶VUHIOH[LYLW\LVEHLQJ
influenced to make someone act against his/her real interests. More research on this link 
needs to be done. However, that this is possible seems particularly evident in her 
account of fractured reflexivity, which presupposes that we can say that these humans 
are lacking in reflexivity as they are insufficiently active agents. Of particular interest 
then is how these fractured reflexives may overcome this impediment. More generally, 
Archer¶V ZRUN VKRXOG EH H[WHQGHG E\ FRQVLGHULQJ KRZ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ PRGHV RI
reflexivity may help develop a stronger agent, capable of overcoming situations of 
powerlessness and domination. This is of interest also in the context of the fourth 
dimension of power. This dimension concerns the subjectification of humans as they 
become objects of knowledge and are constrained by norms of normality or 
abnormality. 
 
The effect on power through transformation of reflexivity in late modernity 
The discussion so far has showQWKHFOHDUO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGQDWXUHRI$UFKHU¶VGHVFULSWLRQ
of modes of reflexivity and how well these link to considerations of power. To conclude 
this section on reflexivity and power, it seems possible to step beyond the theoretical 
discussions of habitus and reflexivity b\ WXUQLQJ WR $UFKHU¶V ZRUN RQ ODWH PRGHUQLW\. 
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The move towards late modernity comes for Archer with increasing, almost continuous 
cultural and social transformation: double morphogenesis (Archer 2012: 4). Crucially, 
her account suggests that this comes with significant implications for the distribution 
and access to power in society in relation to modes of reflexivity. 
Her account stands opposed to the institutionalised individualism supported by 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) as previously suggested ,WDOVRRSSRVHV%RXUGLHX¶V
thought by claiming that habitus becomes increasingly unimportant, particularly for the 
social realm. Thus, Bourdieu µmay have been more or less right in practice for the 
period to which the bulk of his work relates¶; however, µthe young of the new 
PLOOHQQLXPDUHQRORQJHU%RXUGLHX¶VSHRSOHEHFDXVHWKH\QRORQJHUOLYHLQ%RXUGLHX¶V
world¶ (Archer 2010: 287). As no equally extensive alternative research on reflexivity is 
currently available, these claims are difficult to challenge. More importantly, making 
VXFK FODLPV LV  DV SUHYLRXVO\ VKRZQ FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK DGRSWLQJ +DXJDDUG¶V IDPLO\
resemblance concept. Of particular interest to power theorists in $UFKHU¶V extended 
reflexivity thesis is the insight that increasing transformation of given social and 
cultural structures affects modes of reflexivity differently and affects their social 
mobility and distribution in society. This provides a clear micro-macro link between 
structural transformation and modes of reflexivity and connects access to power to the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V UHIOH[LYLW\ For example, communicative reflexives with their aim for 
contextual continuity and dovetailing of opportunities are particularly disadvantaged 
and unprepared. They can no longer rely on their habits or habitus with the increase in 
social transformation, as change has become too fast to be responded to by 
intergenerational socialisation. As this process is seen as unstoppable in advanced 
societies (Archer 2012: 305), communicative reflexives will decline and leave space for 
an increase in autonomous reflexives, albeit only for a transition period towards 
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reflexive imperative. Autonomous reflexivity becomes a personal power for social 
mobility (Archer 2007: 190). 
The effects become especially clear in the attempts to protect oneself from 
change, which in late modernity become themselves a result of reflexive deliberation 
and come with costs (Archer 2012: 305). Put differently, to keep the current socio-
economic and cultural context, a person can no longer rely on habitus and instead has to 
constantly reflect upon the changes in society and attempt to stop or undo them. The 
continuation of the status quo is therefore no longer unconsciously maintained over 
generations. Instead, it has to be constantly and consciously maintained, which leads to 
higher risks and costs. The contextual incongruity and extensive requirement to 
deliberately reflect will finally lead not only WR WKH PRUSKRJHQHWLF VRFLDO RUGHU¶V
dominant form of reflexivity, the meta-reflexive, but also to an increase in fractured 
reflexives. Archer argues that they are not a transitional phenomenon and should lead to 
an acceptance and integration of this new variety of modalities of relational association 
at the level of civil society (Archer 2012: 291). This is necessary as their increase 
coincides with the decrease of communicative reflexives, leaving fractured reflexives 
with a double negative effect: internal anxiety and disorientation without external, 
collective support which traditionally ZDVSURYLGHGWKURXJKFRPPXQLFDWLYHUHIOH[LYHV¶
social solidarity (Archer 2012: 190). $UFKHU¶VUHVHDUFKLQWRUHIOHxivity in late modernity 
opens up a new dimension to power in society and of problems that the power debate 
may wish to tackle. Her account of reflexivity does not only link reflexivity to the 
distribution and access of power, but also offers concrete claims on how they change in 
society to the disadvantage of communicative and fractured reflexives. It certainly 
warrants further research into these claims but also potential solutions or alternatives, 
for a functioning society with active agents and predominantly meta-reflexives. 
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Conclusion - power between habitus and reflexivity 
The connection between Archer and the power literature remains underdeveloped and 
this article therefore FRQVLGHUHG $UFKHU¶V SRWHQWLDO FRQWULEXWLRQV. In particular, it 
focused on the successful adoption of Bourdieu for power analysis $UFKHU¶V
counterpart in the habitus-reflexivity debate in social theory. Both offer significant 
accounts of socialisation, while Bourdieu tends towards social imperialism and social 
determinism. Archer¶Vhumanist emphasis in her research on reflexivity through internal 
conversation comes in turn with problematic commitments. This article therefore 
suggests going beyond an incorporation of the habitus-reflexivity dichotomy of social 
theory into the power debate. The task is instead to find a way to access both Bourdieu 
and Archer without reproducing their weaknesses and especially their conflict. 
This article turns towards +DXJDDUG¶V IDPLO\ UHVHPEODQFH FRQFHSW DQG WKH
binary signature of power for a new perspective. By adopting this framework instead of 
attempting the discussed empirical or theoretical hybridisation, habitus and reflexivity 
are considered in a complex binary relationship. This acknowledges $UFKHU¶VDUJXPHQWV
against Bourdieu, e.g. the historical relevance of their arguments, while it nonetheless 
leaves space for the dispositional DFFRXQW RI %RXUGLHX¶V habitus. Building on this 
complex introduction of Archer, this article suggests the following three areas for 
further research; each provides a central link EHWZHHQ$UFKHU¶VFRQFHSWUHIOH[LYLW\DQG
the power literature: (i) the agential power of active ageQF\ EDVHG RQ $UFKHU¶V
dynamic, positional account of reflexivity as modus Vivendi, that affects social 
mobility; (ii) reflexivity as source or means of four-dimensional power, with active 
agency also providing potential means for resisting or overcoming unfavourable forms 
of power; research on reflexivity thus can become a tool to increase the power of the 
powerlessness; and (iii) the transformation of reflexivity in late modernity and its 
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implications for the distribution and access of power in society. It is along these lines, 
and by building on the family resemblance approach, that this article proposes the 
LQWURGXFWLRQRI$UFKHU¶VZRUNLQWRWKHSRZHUGHEDWH 
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